



Data for Governance Alliance Policy Brief No. 27

As Africans enter busy political year,
Scepticism marks weakening support
for elections

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1 February 2024

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Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 761 | **Hervé Akinocho**

Summary

The year 2024 promises a bumper crop of elections in Africa. National contests are planned in 23 African countries, from Comoros' presidential election in January to Ghana's in December (EISA, 2024; Chemam, 2024).

Even smooth elections are times of high stakes and tension that can put democratic processes to the test. And Africa's elections haven't always been showcases of smooth organisation, free and fair playing fields, and universally accepted outcomes (Gueye, 2009; M'Cormack-Hale & Dome, 2022). The past decade has seen a multitude of challenges to democratic norms in the pursuit of power, from incumbents manipulating constitutions to stay in power, repression of legitimate campaign activities, and pre- and post-election violence to electoral fraud and coups d'état. Just since 2020, the continent has seen nine successful coups, six of them in West Africa and eight in French-speaking countries (AJLabs, 2023; Africanews, 2023; Adekoya, 2021; Freedom House, 2019; Mbulle-Nziege & Cheeseman, 2022; Institute for Security Studies, 2023; Zounmenou & Adam, 2021; Darracq & Magnani, 2011).



Such irregularities and abuses continue despite attempts by regional organisations to reinforce democratic processes. For example, the Economic Community of West African States (2001) Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance provides that any constitutional or election-law reforms within six months of an election should require consensus by all sides, but political players often bypass this provision.

While elections are just one aspect of democracy (Lindberg, 2006), they draw immense public attention, and poorly managed, unfair, or contentious elections may undermine citizens' trust in elections and the workings of democracy (Afrobarometer, 2023; M'Cormack-Hale & Dome, 2022a, b; Bratton & Bhoojedhur, 2019; Penar, Aiko, Bentley, & Han, 2016; Penar, 2016; Darracq & Magnani 2011; Zounmenou & Adam, 2021).

Efforts by the political class and electoral bodies to shore up public confidence in elections often involve complex and costly control systems, such as electronic voting in Nigeria, that have pushed the per-capita cost of African elections to more than double the global average without ensuring elections that are widely seen as legitimate (Sawyer, 2022).

As citizens across the continent enter a busy electoral season, how do they perceive the quality and efficacy of their elections?

Findings from Afrobarometer's Round 9 surveys in 39 African countries show that while most Africans endorse elections as the best method for choosing their leaders, this preference has weakened over the past decade. Most feel free to vote as they choose, and they assess

their most recent election as largely free and fair, but fewer than half think voting ensures representative, accountable governance. And public trust in national electoral-management bodies is weak in most countries.

Afrobarometer surveys

Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan survey research network that provides reliable data on African experiences and evaluations of democracy, governance, and quality of life. Nine survey rounds in up to 42 countries have been completed since 1999. Round 9 surveys (2021/2023) cover 39 countries. (See Appendix Table A.1 for a list of countries and fieldwork dates.)

Afrobarometer's national partners conduct face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice that yield country-level results with margins of error of +/-2 to +/-3 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.

This analysis is based on 53,444 interviews in 39 countries. Over-time comparisons focus on 30 countries included in all rounds of Afrobarometer from Round 5 through Round 9 (or 31 countries from Round 6 through Round 9), but not all questions were asked in every country in every round. The data are weighted to ensure nationally representative samples. When reporting multi-country averages, all countries are weighted equally (rather than in proportion to population size).

Key findings

Support for elections and multiparty competition

- Three-fourths (75%) of Africans support fair, open, and honest elections as the best way to choose their leaders, including 50% who "strongly agree" with this view ([Figure 1](#)).
 - More than six in 10 citizens support elections in all surveyed countries except Lesotho, where a majority (54%) favour other methods for choosing leaders. Support for elections ranges up to about nine out of 10 citizens in Liberia (92%) and Sierra Leone (89%) ([Figure 2](#)).
 - Support for electing leaders increases with age, ranging from 73% among 18- to 35-year-olds to 78% among those over age 55. It is notably stronger in East Africa (83%) and West Africa (79%) than in other regions (69%-71%) ([Figure 3](#)).
- However, while support for choosing leaders via elections remains robust, it has declined significantly over the past decade ([Figure 4](#)). On average across 29 countries where this question was asked in both 2011/2013 and 2021/2023, this support has dropped by 8 percentage points, including massive declines in Tunisia (-24 percentage points), Burkina Faso (-19 points), and Lesotho (-19 points). Sierra Leone is the only surveyed country that records significantly increased support for elections (+13 points).
- Nearly two-thirds (64%) of Africans support multiparty competition to ensure that voters have real choices in who governs them, while 34% think political parties foster division and confusion and their country doesn't need many of them ([Figure 5](#)).
 - Demand for a multiparty system exceeds three-fourths of adults in nine countries, led by Congo-Brazzaville (81%), Botswana (80%), and Seychelles (80%) ([Figure 6](#)). But fewer than half of citizens want party competition in Tunisia (32%), Lesotho (34%), Sudan (38%), Burkina Faso (39%), Mali (40%), São Tomé and Príncipe (41%),

and Guinea (43%) – in many cases countries that have experienced crises, attempted or successful coups d'état, or even civil war.

- On average across 30 countries surveyed consistently since 2011/2013, support for multiparty competition has been stable around about two-thirds (62%-64%) of the population. But country-level changes have been striking, including double-digit increases in support in Eswatini (+31 percentage points), Botswana (+18), Kenya (+17), and Senegal (+17). In contrast, support for party competition has declined sharply in Lesotho (-36 points), Niger (-20), Mali (-18), Burkina Faso (-17), and Guinea (-14) ([Figure 7](#)).
- The desire for a multiparty system is somewhat weaker among older citizens (-7 percentage points), much weaker among less educated citizens (-16 points), and particularly weak in North Africa (44%, vs. 79% in Central Africa) ([Figure 8](#)).
- Almost three-fourths (73%) of citizens say that after losing an election, the opposition should cooperate with the government to help develop the country, rather than monitor and criticise the government to hold it accountable. This is the majority view in all surveyed countries, ranging from 55% in Mauritania to 84% in Cabo Verde ([Figure 9](#)).

Participation in elections

- Almost matching support for elections, self-reported voter turnout in their country's most recent national election approaches three-fourths of adults (72%) ([Figure 10](#)). Participation rates are particularly high in Seychelles (91%), Sierra Leone (89%), and Liberia (89%), while fewer than half of citizens say they voted in Morocco (49%), Gabon (48%), Sudan (42%), Côte d'Ivoire (41%), and Cameroon (41%).
- The youngest adults (63% of 18- to 35-year-olds) are far less likely to say they voted than older cohorts (78%-84%). Reported voting rates are also relatively low among women, urban residents, and the most educated respondents, and are far lower in North Africa and Central Africa (both 51%) than in other regions (72%-79%) ([Figure 11](#)).

How well elections work

- Fewer than half (42%) of Africans believe that their country's elections ensure that members of Parliament (MPs) represent the views of voters. A similar minority (45%) say their elections enable voters to remove leaders from office who fail to align with the desires of the people ([Figure 12](#)).
- These assessments have remained fairly stable over the past eight years ([Figure 13](#)).
- Tanzania (64%) and Ghana (62%) register the highest levels of confidence that elections ensure representation, while fewer than one in five citizens in Gabon (17%) and Eswatini (18%) agree ([Figure 14](#)). Interestingly, some countries often recognised for high levels of democratisation record below-average levels of confidence in the efficacy of elections in ensuring representation, including Botswana (25%), Cabo Verde (34%), Mauritius (36%), and Seychelles (39%).
- Confidence that elections enable voters to replace non-performing leaders is strikingly low in Gabon (14%), where the Bongo family succession lasted 55 years before being terminated by a coup d'état in August 2023, and in Eswatini (15%), where a constitutional monarchy has resisted demands for political reform. Even

though Mauritius and Botswana are touted as democratic models, only one-third of their citizens (34% each) see their elections as empowering voters to unseat incumbents. In contrast, the strongest faith in this function of elections is expressed in Ghana (80%), which has witnessed multiple changes in both head of state and ruling party, and the Gambia (72%), where 22 years of dictatorship ended with electoral defeat and exile for Yahya Jammeh (Al Jazeera, 2017).

- Perceptions that elections guarantee representation are particularly weak among the most educated citizens (37%) and citizens in Central African countries (30%) ([Figure 15](#)). The pattern is almost identical with regard to the view that elections enable voters to remove non-performing leaders.

Quality and legitimacy of elections


- Africans overwhelmingly say they feel "completely free" (65%) or "somewhat free" (20%) to vote for the candidate of their choice without feeling pressured. Only 14% indicate that they feel pressured or constrained ([Figure 16](#)).
 - This sense of freedom is almost universal (97% "completely" or "somewhat" free) in the Gambia, Zambia, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania. It is far less widespread in Ethiopia and Eswatini, where only 28% and 35%, respectively, feel "completely free" ([Figure 17](#)).
 - West Africans are most likely to say they feel somewhat/completely free to vote as they wish (90%), while Central Africans feel least free (75%) ([Figure 18](#)).
- Six out of 10 Africans say their most recent national elections were "completely free and fair" (37%) or "free and fair with minor problems" (23%). However, one-third (34%) of respondents report that their elections were "not free and fair" or "free and fair with major problems" ([Figure 19](#)).
 - These assessments vary by more than 60 percentage points across countries, ranging from just one-fourth of Gabonese (24%) and Sudanese (25%) to almost nine out of 10 Tanzanians (87%) and Liberians (85%) who say their elections were generally free and fair ([Figure 20](#)).
 - Perceptions that elections have been free and fair are far less common in Central and North Africa (37% and 40%, respectively) than in other regions (59%-66%). Rural residents, older citizens, and less educated respondents are more likely to see their elections as free and fair than urbanites, younger, and more educated respondents ([Figure 21](#)).
 - On average across 31 countries surveyed consistently since 2014/2015, the perception of elections as generally free and fair has declined from 64% to 58% ([Figure 22](#)).
- On two other indicators of the election environment – ballot secrecy and personal safety – a majority of Africans see little cause for concern. Still, significant minorities think it's possible for powerful people to find out how they voted (30%) and report experiencing "some" or "a lot" of fear of intimidation or violence during their most recent election (21%) ([Figure 23](#)).
 - Doubts about ballot secrecy are especially high in Sudan (53%) and Cameroon (52%), while fewer than one in six respondents share this concern in Sierra Leone (16%), Zambia (15%), Gambia (15%), and Tanzania (13%) ([Table 1](#)).

- Close to half of respondents in Guinea and Uganda (47% each) report fearing intimidation or violence during their last election – about 10 times as many as in Mauritius (5%), Morocco (5%), and Madagascar (4%).
- Moreover, public trust in the agency charged with organising and managing elections is fairly weak in most countries (Figure 24). On average, only four in 10 citizens (39%) say they trust their national electoral commission “somewhat” or “a lot,” while 57% express little or no trust. Tanzania is an outlier, with 79% of citizens expressing trust in the electoral commission. Fewer than one in four respondents say the same in Gabon (16%), Angola (21%), Eswatini (22%), Congo-Brazzaville (23%), and Nigeria (23%).
- Trust in the electoral commission is particularly low among urban residents (35%), young people (37%), citizens with secondary or post-secondary education (35%), and Central Africans (24%) (Figure 25).
- On average across 27 countries where this question was asked consistently since 2011/2013, trust in the electoral commission has dropped by 10 percentage points, from 51% to 41% (Figure 26).

Charts

Support for elections and multiparty competition

Figure 1: Support for elections | 39 countries | 2021/2023




Respondents were asked: Which of the following statements is closest to your view?

Statement 1: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open, and honest elections.

Statement 2: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.

Figure 2: Support for elections | 39 countries | 2021/2023




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Statement 2: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.

(% who "agree" or "strongly agree" that leaders should be chosen through elections)

Figure 3: Support for elections | by demographic group¹ | 39 countries | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: Which of the following statements is closest to your view?

Statement 1: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open, and honest elections.

Statement 2: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.

(% who "agree" or "strongly agree" with Statement 1)

¹ Afrobarometer's Lived Poverty Index (LPI) measures respondents' levels of material deprivation by asking how often they or their families went without basic necessities (enough food, enough water, medical care, enough cooking fuel, and a cash income) during the preceding year. For more on lived poverty, see Mattes and Patel (2022).

Regions: North Africa (Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia), Central Africa (Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe), Southern Africa (Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe), East Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda), West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo)

Figure 4: Change in support for elections | 29 countries* | 2011-2023





Figure shows change, in percentage points, between survey rounds in 2011/2013 and 2021/2023 in the proportion of respondents who "agree" or "strongly agree" that leaders should be chosen through elections.

* Question was not asked in Morocco in 2011/2013.

Figure 5: Support for multiparty competition | 39 countries | 2021/2023




Respondents were asked: Which of the following statements is closest to your view?

Statement 1: Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in [this country].

Statement 2: Many political parties are needed to make sure that [this country's citizens] have real choices in who governs them.

Do your own analysis of Afrobarometer data – on any question, for any country and survey round. It's easy and free at www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis.

Figure 6: Support for multiparty competition | 39 countries | 2021/2023




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Statement 2: Many political parties are needed to make sure that [this country's citizens] have real choices in who governs them.

(% who "agree" or "strongly agree" that many political parties are needed to make sure that citizens have real choices in who governs them)

Figure 7: Support for multiparty competition | biggest gainers and losers
 | 30 countries | 2011-2021




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(% who "agree" or "strongly agree" that many political parties are needed to make sure that citizens have real choices in who governs them)

Figure 8: Support for multiparty competition | by demographic group | 39 countries
 | 2021/2023




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(% who "agree" or "strongly agree" that many political parties are needed to make sure that citizens have real choices in who governs them)

Figure 9: After losing an election: Monitor government or cooperate? | 38 countries* | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: Which of the following statements is closest to your view?

Statement 1: After losing an election, opposition parties should monitor and criticize the government in order to hold it accountable.


Statement 2: Once an election is over, opposition parties and politicians should accept defeat and cooperate with government to help it develop the country.

(% who "agree" or "strongly agree" with Statement 2)

* Question was not asked in Eswatini.


Participation in elections

Figure 10: Voted in the most recent national election | 39 countries | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: In the last national election, held in [20XX], did you vote, or not, or were you too young to vote? Or can't you remember whether you voted? (% who say they voted) (Respondents who were too young to vote in the last national election are excluded.)


Figure 11: Voted in the most recent national election | by demographic group
 | 39 countries | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: In the last national election, held in [20XX], did you vote, or not, or were you too young to vote? Or can't you remember whether you voted? (% who say they voted) (Respondents who were too young to vote in the last national election are excluded.)

How well elections work

Figure 12: Efficacy of elections | 39 countries* | 2021/2023




Respondents were asked: Think about how elections work in practice in this country. How well do elections:

Ensure that representatives to Parliament reflect the views of voters?

Enable voters to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want?

* Results for the question about MPs do not include Burkina Faso, where this question was not posed to the full sample.

Figure 13: Efficacy of elections | 31 countries* | 2014-2023



Respondents were asked: Think about how elections work in practice in this country. How well do elections:


Ensure that representatives to Parliament reflect the views of voters?

Enable voters to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want?

(% who say "fairly well" or "very well")

* Results for the question about MPs do not include Burkina Faso, where this question was not posed to the full sample.

Figure 14: Efficacy of elections | 39 countries* | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: Think about how elections work in practice in this country. How well do elections:


Ensure that representatives to Parliament reflect the views of voters?

Enable voters to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want?

(% who say "fairly well" or "very well")

* Results for the question about MPs do not include Burkina Faso, where this question was not posed to the full sample.

Figure 15: Efficacy of elections | by demographic group | 39 countries* | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: Think about how elections work in practice in this country. How well do elections:

Ensure that representatives to Parliament reflect the views of voters?

Enable voters to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want?

(% who say "fairly well" or "very well")

* Results for the question about MPs do not include Burkina Faso, where this question was not posed to the full sample.

Quality and legitimacy of elections

Figure 16: Free to vote without pressure | 39 countries | 2021/2023






Figure 17: Free to vote without pressure | 39 countries | 2021/2023




Respondents were asked: In this country, how free are you to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured?

Figure 18: Free to vote without pressure | by region | 39 countries | 2021/2023




Respondents were asked: In this country, how free are you to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured? (% who say "somewhat free" or "completely free")

Figure 19: How free and fair was the most recent election? | 39 countries | 2021/2023




Respondents were asked: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [20XX]?

Figure 20: Most recent election was free and fair | 39 countries | 2021/2023




Respondents were asked: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [20XX]? (% who say "completely free and fair" or "free and fair with minor problems")

Figure 21: Most recent election was generally free and fair | by demographic group | 39 countries | 2021/2023




Respondents were asked: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [20XX]? (% who say "completely free and fair" or "free and fair with minor problems")

Figure 22: Most recent election was generally free and fair | 31 countries | 2014-2023



Respondents were asked: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [20XX]?

Figure 23: Election quality: Ballot secrecy and fear of violence | 39 countries
 | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked:


How likely do you think it is that powerful people can find out how you voted, even though there is supposed to be a secret ballot in this country? (% who say "somewhat likely" or "very likely")

During the last national election, in [20XX], how much did you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence? (% who say "somewhat" or "a lot")

Table 1: Ballot secrecy and fear of violence | 39 countries | 2021/2023

	Somewhat/Very likely that powerful people can find out how you voted	Feared intimidation or violence somewhat/a lot during last election
Sudan	53%	10%
Cameroon	52%	24%
Tunisia	48%	11%
Mauritius	47%	5%
Mozambique	46%	34%
South Africa	43%	16%
Congo-Brazzaville	41%	28%
Côte d'Ivoire	40%	30%
Gabon	40%	23%
Ethiopia	39%	15%
Seychelles	37%	8%
Nigeria	37%	32%
Eswatini	36%	16%
Niger	36%	18%
Botswana	34%	9%
Angola	34%	17%
Morocco	33%	5%
Kenya	30%	38%
Mali	29%	18%
Guinea	29%	47%
Namibia	29%	15%
Benin	27%	23%
Mauritania	27%	18%
Liberia	25%	21%
Malawi	24%	34%
Cabo Verde	23%	7%
Senegal	21%	23%
Burkina Faso	21%	17%
Togo	21%	31%
Lesotho	21%	11%
Uganda	21%	47%
São Tomé and Príncipe	18%	10%
Ghana	18%	17%
Zimbabwe	17%	33%
Madagascar	17%	4%
Sierra Leone	16%	21%
Zambia	15%	37%
Gambia	15%	23%
Tanzania	13%	12%
39-country average	30%	21%
Key	<20%	21%-30%
	31%-40%	41%-50%
	>50%	


Figure 24: Trust in the electoral commission | 38 countries* | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The [national electoral commission]?

* Question was not asked in Guinea.


Figure 25: Trust in the electoral commission | 38 countries* | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The [national electoral commission]? (% who say "somewhat" or "a lot")

* Question was not asked in Guinea.

Figure 26: Trust in the electoral commission | 27 countries* | 2011-2023



Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The [national electoral commission]?

* Excludes Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia, where the question was not asked in every survey round.

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Appendix

Table A.1: Afrobarometer Round 9 fieldwork dates and previous survey rounds

Country	Round 9 fieldwork	Previous survey rounds
Angola	Feb.-March 2022	2019
Benin	Jan. 2022	2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017, 2020
Botswana	June-July 2022	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019
Burkina Faso	Sept.-Oct. 2022	2008, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2019
Cabo Verde	July-Aug. 2022	2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017, 2019
Cameroon	March 2022	2013, 2015, 2018, 2021
Congo-Brazzaville	June-July 2023	NA
Côte d'Ivoire	Nov.-Dec. 2021	2013, 2014, 2017, 2019
Eswatini	Oct.-Nov. 2022	2013, 2015, 2018, 2021
Ethiopia	May-June 2023	2013, 2020
Gabon	Nov.-Dec. 2021	2015, 2017, 2020
Gambia	Aug.-Sept. 2022	2018, 2021
Ghana	April 2022	1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019
Guinea	Aug. 2022	2013, 2015, 2017, 2019
Kenya	Nov.-Dec. 2021	2003, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2016, 2019
Lesotho	Feb.-March 2022	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2020
Liberia	Aug.-Sept. 2022	2008, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2020
Madagascar	April-May 2022	2005, 2008, 2013, 2015, 2018
Malawi	Feb. 2022	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019
Mali	July 2022	2001, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2020
Mauritania	Nov. 2022	NA
Mauritius	March 2022	2012, 2014, 2017, 2020
Morocco	Aug.-Sept. 2022	2013, 2015, 2018, 2021
Mozambique	Oct.-Nov. 2022	2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021
Namibia	Oct.-Nov. 2021	1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019
Niger	June 2022	2013, 2015, 2018, 2020
Nigeria	March 2022	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2020
São Tomé and Príncipe	Dec. 2022	2015, 2018
Senegal	May-June 2022	2002, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2021
Seychelles	Dec. 2022	NA
Sierra Leone	June-July 2022	2012, 2015, 2018, 2020
South Africa	Nov.-Dec. 2022	2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2018, 2021
Sudan	Nov.-Dec. 2022	2013, 2015, 2018, 2021
Tanzania	Sept.-Oct. 2022	2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2021
Togo	March 2022	2012, 2014, 2017, 2021
Tunisia	Feb.-March 2022	2013, 2015, 2018, 2020
Uganda	Jan. 2022	2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2019
Zambia	Aug.-Sept. 2022	1999, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2020
Zimbabwe	March-April 2022	1999, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2021

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Afrobarometer, a nonprofit corporation with headquarters in Ghana, is a pan-African, non-partisan research network. Regional coordination of national partners in about 35 countries is provided by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in South Africa, and the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi in Kenya. Michigan State University (MSU) and the University of Cape Town (UCT) provide technical support to the network.

Financial support for Afrobarometer is provided by Sweden via the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) via the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Open Society Foundations - Africa, Luminous, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Mastercard Foundation, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, the European Union Commission, the World Bank Group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Uganda, the Embassy of Sweden in Zimbabwe, the Global Centre for Pluralism, and GIZ.

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Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 761 | 1 February 2024